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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus curiae Professor Tyler T. Ochoa is a Professor of Law with the High
Tech Law Institute at Santa Clara University School of Law.1 Professor Ochoa is a
recognized expert in U.S. copyright law: he is currently the sole author of annual
updates to the West treatise The Law of Copyright, by the late Howard B. Abrams.
Professor Ochoa is also a co-author (with Craig Joyce and Michael Carroll) of a
widely-used law school casebook, Copyright Law (Carolina Academic Press 11th
ed. 2020), and the author of the Copyright chapter in the hornbook Understanding
Intellectual Property Law (Carolina Academic Press 4th ed. 2020). Professor
Ochoa has published 16 articles or book chapters on copyright law, one of which
was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 202
(2003). Professor Ochoa also authored an amicus brief on behalf of 15 copyright
and intellectual property law professors that was cited and relied on by a panel of
this court in Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 9 F.4th 1167, 1173, 1175
(9th Cir. 2021). In addition to his expertise in copyright law, Professor Ochoa has
published three articles on statutes of limitations, co-authored with Andrew J.
Wistrich, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Central District of California (retired).

1

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4), amicus certifies that no party or party’s
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part or contributed money intended to
fund the preparation or submission of the brief; and no person other than amicus
contributed money intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief.
Both parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
1

Professor Ochoa is an unbiased observer who does not have any financial
interest in the outcome of this litigation (except that he pays a monthly fee to his
cable television provider to watch the premium Starz channel). The only interest
that Professor Ochoa has in this litigation is a scholarly interest in both copyright
law and statutes of limitations, and a commitment to the orderly development of
both areas of law in the future.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Every Court of Appeals to have considered the issue has applied the
discovery rule of accrual to the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations in cases in
which the plaintiff was justifiably ignorant of the existence of its cause of action.
Ordinarily, the three-year statute of limitations means that a copyright owner can
only recover damages for infringements occurring within three years before it filed
its lawsuit. Under the discovery rule, however, a plaintiff may recover damages
for infringements occurring more than three years before the lawsuit was filed, so
long as the plaintiff filed within three years of the date that it discovered, or
reasonably could have discovered, the existence of the infringement.
MGM argues that even if the discovery rule applies, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion in Petrella requires that damages be limited to infringing acts
occurring within three years before filing, regardless of the date of discovery. This
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interpretation of Petrella is both incorrect and inherently self-contradictory: in
effect, it applies a “wrongful act” or “occurrence” rule of accrual while purporting
to retain the discovery rule. The proper approach is to presume that acts occurring
more than three years before filing are barred, but to allow the copyright owner to
recover damages for earlier acts if it shows that it did not discover the alleged
infringement, and reasonably could not have discovered it, at an earlier time.

ARGUMENT
I.

Every Court of Appeals to Have Considered the Issue Has Applied the
Discovery Rule of Accrual in Cases Arising Under the Copyright Act.
“Generally, a cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run when a

defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff’s business.” Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971). In general, therefore, “[a]
copyright claim thus arises or accrues when an infringing act occurs.” Petrella v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 670 (2014) (internal quotes omitted).
In many instances, however, an injured plaintiff is unaware of his or her
injury at the time of the wrongful act. In such instances, courts have seen fit to
adopt a “discovery” rule of accrual. See Petrella, 572 U.S. at 670 n.4. As the
Supreme Court explained in Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1875), the
discovery rule originated in cases of alleged fraud, where relief was sought in
courts of equity, and was later applied to cases at law.
3

In Bailey, the Bankrupt Act of 1867 provided that “no suit at law or in equity
shall in any case be maintainable … unless the same shall be brought within two
years from the time of the cause of action accrued …” Id. at 344 (quoting the
statute; emphasis added by the Court). Bailey, the assignee in bankruptcy, filed
suit to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance, more than three years after he
was appointed, and more than two years after the debtor had been discharged. The
Court held that the discovery rule applied, even though the plain language of the
statute did not admit of any exceptions:
[W]here the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it
without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of
the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, [even]
though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the
party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the
other party.
Id. at 348. Accord, Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (quoting
Bailey). The Court explained that this principle was generally applicable:
[W]e are of opinion … that the weight of judicial authority, both in
this country and in England, is in favor of the application of the rule to
suits at law as well as in equity…. [T]his is founded in a sound and
philosophical view of the principles of the statutes of limitation. They
were enacted to prevent frauds; to prevent parties from asserting rights
after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the evidence…. To
hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner
that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the
fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the
law which was designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is
made successful and secure.
Bailey, 88 U.S. at 349. See also Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added):
4

This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation.
If the [Act] had an explicit statute of limitation for bringing suit …,
the time would not have begun to run until after petitioners had
discovered, or had failed in reasonable diligence to discover, the
alleged deception … which is the basis of this suit.
Over time, the Court began extending the discovery rule beyond cases
involving fraud to other cases in which the plaintiff was justifiably ignorant of his
or her cause of action, despite reasonable diligence. In Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S.
163 (1949), for example, plaintiff brought suit under the Federal Employer’s
Liability Act for a respiratory disease, silicosis, contracted during the course of his
employment. Urie filed suit on November 25, 1941, so under the three-year statute
of limitations, “the court could not entertain the claim if Urie’s ‘cause of action
accrued’ before November 25, 1938.” Id. at 169. Because Urie had been exposed
to silica dust since 1910, Urie undoubtedly could have sued at an earlier time had
he been aware of “the slow and tragic disintegration of his lungs.” Id. Nonetheless,
this Court held that the cause of action did not “accrue” until “Urie became too ill
to work in May of 1940.” Id. at 170. It explained:
We do not think the [statute] intended such consequences to attach to
blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those consequences can be
reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations,
which conventionally require the assertion of claims within a
specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights….
There is no suggestion that Urie should have known he had silicosis at
any earlier date.
Id. (emphasis added).

5

The Supreme Court has also recognized that the discovery rule applies to
actions for medical malpractice under the Federal Torts Claims Act. In United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), the Court noted that the Courts of Appeals
had extended the discovery rule to medical malpractice claims, id. at 120 n.7, and
it explained:
That [the plaintiff] has been injured in fact may be unknown or
unknowable until the injury manifests itself; and the facts about
causation may be in the control of the putative defendant, unavailable
to the plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain. The prospect is not
so bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts that he has
been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.
The Court also quoted from comment e to section 899 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (1979), which explained that the discovery rule was an
alternative to “various devices to extend the time of the statute,” including
equitable tolling:
In a wave of recent decisions these various devices have been
replaced by decisions meeting the issue directly and holding that the
statute must be construed as not intended to start to run until the
plaintiff has in fact discovered the fact that he has suffered injury or
by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it.
There have also been a number of instances in which a similar rule
has been applied to other professional malpractice, such as that of
attorneys or accountants and the rule may thus become a general one.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 120 n.7 (quoting the Restatement) (emphasis added).
The Restatement’s prediction has largely come to pass. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, “Federal courts … generally apply a discovery accrual rule
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when a statute is silent on the issue.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000).2
Moreover, the discovery rule can be considered to be one type of equitable tolling,
and the Supreme Court has held that unless a statute of limitations is jurisdictional,
it is subject to a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling applies. Irwin v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (“Time requirements in lawsuits
between private litigants are customarily subject to ‘equitable tolling.’”); id. at 9596 (describing this principle as a “rebuttable presumption”); United States v. Wong,
575 U.S. 402, 407-08, 412 (2015) (applying Irwin’s rebuttable presumption to the
Federal Tort Claims Act). Consequently, as the Supreme Court has noted, every
Court of Appeals to have considered the issue has held that the discovery rule
applies to copyright infringement claims. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 670 n.4 (collecting
cases); see also Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir.
2014) (“the text and structure of the Copyright Act … evince Congress’s intent to
employ the discovery rule, not the injury rule. Policy considerations also counsel in
favor of the discovery rule in this context.”); Howard B. Abrams & Tyler T. Ochoa,
The Law of Copyright §16:18 (West 2021 ed.) (collecting cases).
2

Of course, where a statute expressly limited the discovery rule to certain
types of claims, the Court declined to apply the discovery rule as a default rule.
TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001). Similarly, where a statute expressly
stated that the time period runs “from the date on which the violation occurs,” 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (emphasis added), the Court applied the plain language of the
statute. Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360 (2019).

7

II.

The Effect of the Discovery Rule is to Extend the Reach of the Statute of
Limitations to Permit the Recovery of Damages for Infringements That
Occurred More Than Three Years Before Suit was Filed.
Petrella is a typical example of how the copyright statute of limitations

ordinarily operates, in cases in which the discovery rule does not apply. In
Petrella, the Supreme Court held that when a series of infringements occurs, the
statute of limitations runs separately for each act of infringement, 572 U.S. at 671,
so that the copyright owner ordinarily may recover damages only for those acts
occurring within three years before the date the lawsuit was filed. Id. at 672.
Petrella’s claim was based on her ownership of the renewal term in her
father’s 1963 screenplay, on which the 1980 movie Raging Bull was based.3 Id. at
673-74. Her claim accrued at the beginning of the renewal term, on January 1,
1992.4 At that time, Petrella was fully aware that Raging Bull had been based, in
part, on her father’s screenplay; that the movie had been released; and that it
continued to be publicly performed and distributed to the public on videotape, so

3

For works published or registered between 1909 and 1977, the Copyright
Act provided an initial term of 28 years, which could be renewed for a second term.
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1991). At the time Petrella registered the renewal term in her
father’s screenplay, in 1991, the second term had a duration of 47 years. Id. In
1998, the renewal term was extended to 67 years, for a total of 95 years of
copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b).
4

For a work registered in 1963, the initial 28-year term lasted until December
31, 1991. 17 U.S.C. § 305 (“All terms of copyright … run to the end of the
calendar year in which they would otherwise expire.”).

8

she could not credibly claim the benefit of the discovery rule.5 Nonetheless, she
delayed filing suit until January 6, 2009. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
that she could claim damages “only for acts of infringement occurring on or after
January 6, 2006.” Id. at 675.
Where the discovery rule applies, however, it allows damages to be
recovered for acts occurring more than three years before an action was filed, so
long as the plaintiff files the action within three years of the date she discovers, or
reasonably could have discovered, the existence of the claim. Polar Bear Prods. v.
Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 2004). In Polar Bear, the defendant
infringed by using footage from the plaintiff’s copyrighted work at twelve different
trade shows between 1995 and 1998. Id. at 704. Polar Bear first became aware of
the infringement when a producer attended one of the trade shows on August 9,
1997. Id. at 707. “Polar Bear filed its complaint against Timex on August 3, 2000,
and thus Polar Bear commenced its suit ‘within three years after the claim
accrued.’” Id. Like MGM in this case, Timex argued that the three-year statute of
limitations “prohibits copyright plaintiffs from obtaining any damages resulting

5

As this Court stated in dismissing Petrella’s claims on grounds of laches, “it
is undisputed Petrella was aware of her potential claims (as was MGM) since 1991,
when her attorney filed her renewal application for the 1963 screenplay.” Petrella
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotes
and brackets omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 572 U.S. 663 (2014) (holding
laches could not bar an action that was timely filed within the three-year statute of
limitations).
9

from infringement occurring more than three years before filing the copyright
action, regardless of the date the plaintiff discovered the infringement.” Id. at 706.
This Court specifically rejected that argument, holding instead that:
§ 507(b) permits damages occurring outside of the three-year window,
so long as the copyright owner did not discover—and reasonably
could not have discovered—the infringement before the commencement of the three-year limitation period. Because Polar Bear did not
discover Timex’s infringement until within three years of filing suit,
Polar Bear may recover damages for infringement that occurred
outside of the three-year window.
Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 706.
Similarly, in Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.
2014), defendant allegedly infringed eight of plaintiff’s photographs by publishing
them without authorization “in various textbooks” between 2005 and 2009. The
plaintiff discovered the infringement in November 2010, when Wiley sought a
retroactive license for one of the photos. He sued for infringement in March 2011.
A three-year lookback period would have limited damages to infringements that
occurred no later than March 2008; but the court held “that under the discovery
rule[,] none of Psihoyos's claims are time-barred.” Id. at 124 (emphasis added);
see also id. at 125 (“we conclude that copyright infringement claims do not accrue
until actual or constructive discovery of the relevant infringement and that the
Act’s statute of limitations did not bar any of Psihoyos’s infringement claims.”)
(emphasis added).

10

Nothing in the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Petrella displaces, or
even purports to displace, the operation of the discovery rule in those exceptional
cases in which it applies. In Petrella, there was no question that the discovery rule
did not apply, and the plaintiff did not claim that it did. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court simply acknowledged, in a footnote, that “nine Courts of Appeals have
adopted, as an alternative to the incident of injury rule, a ‘discovery rule,’ which
starts the limitations period when ‘the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence
should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis for the claim.’” Petrella,
572 U.S. at 670 n.4. There was no further need to discuss or to rule on any aspect
of the discovery rule, because it obviously did not apply to Petrella’s claim, so it
would not have affected the outcome. Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly
qualified its opinion with language indicating that the three-year period is subject
to exceptions. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 670 (“A claim ordinarily accrues …” and “the
limitation period generally begins to run …”) (emphasis added); id. at 672 (“when
a defendant has engaged (or is alleged to have engaged) in a series of discrete
infringing acts, the copyright holder’s suit ordinarily will be timely under § 507(b)
[only] with respect to more recent acts of infringement (i.e., acts within the threeyear window), but untimely with respect to prior acts of the same or similar kind.”)
(emphasis added).

11

III.

The Second Circuit’s Opinion in Sohm is Inherently Self-Contradictory
and Effectively Eliminates the Discovery Rule While Purporting to
Preserve It.
In Sohm v. Scholastic, Inc., 959 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2020), photographer Sohm

licensed publisher Scholastic to use numerous photographs in its publications. The
licenses were granted between 1995 and 2011. First Amended Complaint ¶11. In
May 2016, Sohm sued Scholastic for infringement, alleging that it had exceeded
the contractual limitations in the licenses as to the “number of copies, distribution
area, language, duration, and/or media.” First Amended Complaint, ¶11. After
discovery revealed details of the infringements, Sohm filed an amended complaint,
alleging 117 infringing uses of 89 different photographs. 959 F.3d at 42.
Sohm moved for summary judgment with respect to 13 uses; Scholastic
responded that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. “Scholastic
[did] not contend that Plaintiffs had actual notice of the relevant infringements, but
rather [it argued] that Plaintiffs, with due diligence, should have discovered the
infringing acts more than three years before bringing their claims.” Sohm v.
Scholastic, Inc., 2018 WL 1605214, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018) (emphasis
added). The district court rejected the argument: “Without identifying any information that would have prompted such an inquiry, … Scholastic cannot simply
rely on the passage of time to establish that Plaintiffs reasonably should have
discovered any infringement.” Id. (emphasis in original). Scholastic also argued

12

that under Petrella, the claims accrued at the time the infringements had occurred.
The district court dismissed that argument in a footnote. Id. at n.21. Accordingly,
the district court “reject[ed] Scholastic’s argument that damages should be limited
to three years before the filing of this case.” Id. at *11.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he Supreme Court [in Petrella]
has not overruled Psihoyos, either implicitly or explicitly, and therefore we must
continue to apply the discovery rule.” 959 F.3d at 50. The Second Circuit also
upheld the district court’s determination that Scholastic had failed to demonstrate
that Sohm should have discovered the infringements at an earlier time. Id. at 51.
“Accordingly, the district court properly rejected Scholastic’s affirmative defense
based on the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations.” Id.
Then, in a bizarre departure from the usual operation of the discovery rule,
the Second Circuit nonetheless held that “in Petrella, the Supreme Court explicitly
delimited damages to the three years prior to the commencement of a copyright
infringement action.” Id.; see also id. at 52 (“we must apply the discovery rule to
determine when a copyright infringement claim accrues, but a three-year lookback
period from the time a suit is filed to determine the extent of the relief available”
and “a plaintiff's recovery is limited to damages incurred during the three years
prior to filing suit.”).

13

With due respect to the Second Circuit, this dual holding is inherently selfcontradictory. Under Petrella’s separate-accrual rule, any damages resulting from
infringements that occurred within three years of filing can already be recovered
under the three-year statute of limitations, even if the plaintiff had long been aware
that the defendant was infringing.6 The discovery rule is only needed or useful to
recover damages for infringements that occurred more than three years before suit
was filed, in those cases in which a plaintiff was blamelessly ignorant that those
infringements had occurred.7 In such cases, the discovery rule allows the plaintiff
to file suit within three years of the date that it reasonably became aware of the
infringement, rather than within three years of the date of the infringing act. By
limiting damages to three years before the date the suit was filed, the court in effect
was adopting an injury rule of accrual, even though it claimed that it was using the
discovery rule of accrual. Sohm effectively eliminates the discovery rule while
purporting to preserve it.

6

Indeed, that is precisely what happened in Petrella: she was allowed to
recover damages for infringements occurring within three years of the date she
filed suit in 2016, even though she had been aware of the existence of her claim
since 1991, some 18 years earlier.
7

As the lower court stated in this case, “[i]f plaintiffs cannot recover for
infringements that occurred more than three years before the lawsuit commenced,
even if they were not aware of the infringements, then the discovery rule serves no
practical purpose.” Starz Entertainment, LLC v. MGM Domestic Television Distribution, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 878, 887 (C.D. Cal. 2021).
14

Attempting to justify its bizarre decision, the court stated “that Petrella’s
plain language explicitly dissociated the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations
from its time limit on damages.” Sohm, 959 F.3d at 52. That assertion is simply
incorrect. Petrella’s three-year “time limit on damages” was expressly based on
the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations. See Petrella, 572 U.S. at 670
(describing 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) as “a three-year look-back limitations period”); id.
at 672 (“the copyright holder's suit ordinarily will be timely under § 507(b) [only]
with respect to more recent acts of infringement (i.e., acts within the three-year
window)”) (emphasis added); id. at 672 (“§ 507(b)’s limitations period … allows
plaintiffs during [the copyright] term to gain retrospective relief running only three
years back from the date the complaint was filed.”).
Sohm’s self-contradictory reasoning has not gone unnoticed. Within three
months of the decision, I published a blog post criticizing the decision. See Tyler
Ochoa, A Second Circuit Panel Misunderstands the Copyright Act’s Statute of
Limitations, at https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/08/a-second-circuitpanel-misunderstands-the-copyright-acts-statute-of-limitations-guest-blog-post.htm
(Aug. 7, 2020); see also Howard B. Abrams & Tyler T. Ochoa, The Law of
Copyright §16:18 (West 2021 ed.). Nimmer likewise agrees that the Sohm opinion
is self-contradictory. See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright §12.05[B][2][d][ii] (Lexis 2021 ed.) (“But, immediately after nominally

15

reaffirming the discovery rule, Sohm v. Scholastic took a hundred-and-eighty
degree turn…. In sum, the practical import of this case is to adopt the injury rule
and reject the discovery rule that it had previously upheld.”).8 Lower courts,
including the district court in this case, have likewise recognized that Sohm’s
interpretation of Petrella “effectively obliterates the discovery rule.” Mitchell v.
Capitol Records, LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 673, 677 (W.D. Ky. 2017) (rejecting a
similar argument pre-Sohm); see Starz Entertainment, LLC v. MGM Domestic
Television Distribution, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 878, 887 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (“a strict
damages bar would ‘eviscerate’ the discovery rule”); D’Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc.
v. Sweetwater Sound, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 3d 121, 135 (D.N.H. 2021) (“this court
respectfully disagrees with the Second Circuit's interpretation [in Sohm].”).9

8

Prof. Patry’s position is unclear. He heaps praise on the lower court’s
opinion in this case (Starz v. MGM): “Judge Dolly Gee of the Central District of
California, in a very scholarly, thorough opinion[,] reviewed Petrella and
subsequent case law on the relationship between when the limitations period
begins and when the cut-off for damages is,” and he states that “her conclusion …
is sound.” William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 20:18, at n. 12.50 (West 2021
ed.). In a different section of his treatise, however, he cites Sohm v. Scholastic with
apparent approval. Patry on Copyright § 20:23, at n. 3.60. Those positions cannot
both be correct, as Judge Gee’s opinion rejected the holding in Sohm v. Scholastic.
9

Indeed, even a district court that agreed with Sohm recognizes that the effect
of limiting damages to a three-year lookback period “appears to be the functional
equivalent of an occurrence rule [of accrual].” Navarro v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
515 F. Supp. 3d 718, 761 (S.D. Ohio 2021); see also id. at 761 (adopting such an
interpretation of Petrella “functionally overrules the discovery rule”); id. at 762
(“as a practical matter, the effects of a limited three-year lookback [period] result
in a form of [the] occurrence rule”).
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CONCLUSION
MGM argues that even if the discovery rule applies, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion in Petrella requires that damages be limited to infringing acts
occurring within three years before filing, regardless of the date of discovery. This
interpretation of Petrella is both incorrect and inherently self-contradictory: in
effect, it applies a “wrongful act” or “occurrence” rule of accrual while purporting
to retain the discovery rule. The only purpose of the discovery rule is to allow a
copyright owner to recover damages for infringements occurring more than three
years before the suit was filed, so long as the copyright owner filed suit within
three years of the date that it discovered, or reasonably could have discovered, the
alleged infringement. A hard three-year limit on damages, therefore, is fundamentally inconsistent with the discovery rule of accrual.
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